Report
to/Rapport au:
Transportation
and Transit Committee/
Comité de transport & des services de
transport en commun
and Council/et au Conseil
22 November 2002/le 22 novembre
2002
Submitted by/Soumis par: R.T.
Leclair, General Manager/Directrice général,
Transportation, Utilities and Public Works/Transport,
services et travaux publics
Contact/Personne-ressource: G.
Diamond, Director/Directeur,
Transit Services/Service du transport en commun
842-3636 ext. 2271, gordon.diamond@transpo.ottawa.on.ca
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Ref N°:
ACS2002-TUP-TRN-0012 |
SUBJECT:
O-TRAIN EVALUATION REPORT
OBJET: RAPPORT
D’ÉVALUATION DE L’O-TRAIN
REPORT
RECOMMENDATION(S)
That the Transportation and
Transit Committee recommend to Council the continuation of the O-Train pilot
project for a maximum of two years, from May 1, 2003.
RECOMMANDATION(S)
DU RAPPORT
Que le Comité des transports et des services de
transport en commun recommande au Conseil de reconduire le projet pilote de
l’O-Train pour une période maximale de deux ans, à compter du 1er
mai 2003.
BACKGROUND
In August 1998, Council of the former Region directed staff to proceed with the development and implementation of a pilot project for light rail with capital costs not to exceed $16 million. At that time, the preferred route and the technology were identified, and the Terms of Reference for the Environmental Assessment were also approved. The initial concept was to proceed with the project as a public private partnership between the Region and CP Rail, among others.
Following a yearlong study, which proceeded in concert with the Environmental Assessment process, Regional Council approved the Light Rail Pilot Project (LRPP) in September 1999. The objectives of the pilot project, as set out in the report, were as follows:
· to determine the technical feasibility of using an existing freight rail corridor for the operation of a diesel light rail rapid transit system;
· to verify expectations about ridership, performance and cost; and,
· to allow proper analysis of possible larger-scale implementation.
In developing the proposed pilot project, the report recognized that it would be a modest project on a relatively short length of track and objectives for ridership and revenues were set in this context.
The scope of the project was to operate diesel light rail trains on the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) line between Greenboro and Bayview serving stations at Confederation Heights, Carleton University and Carling Avenue (Exhibit 1). The rail service would complement the existing bus-based rapid transit system with interchange stations at Bayview and Greenboro. The pilot project would last for at least two years, with the possibility of an extension for up to two additional years.
It had not been possible to negotiate a satisfactory turnkey approach with a private partner, the project was therefore to be implemented and operated by the City with private contractors playing more restricted roles.
The eight-kilometre single-track rail line was to be upgraded by CPR and a passing track provided at Carleton University. The five train stations and one Transitway station were to be constructed by CPR and the maintenance facility at Walkley Yards was to be upgraded by CPR. Three Bombardier Talent trains were to be purchased from Bombardier, with a sell-back option at the end of the pilot project and the train maintenance was to be the responsibility of Bombardier.
Other elements of the pilot project scope included training OC Transpo bus operators to drive the trains in one-person-operation mode, developing a suitable signalling system, and contracting for rail traffic control and track maintenance.
A $16 million capital budget was approved to cover the use of the trains for two years, the construction of the stations, upgrades to the CPR railway line and the maintenance facility, the installation of a signalling system, operator training and project management. In addition, Regional Council approved approximately $4 million for each of the two years of the pilot project to operate the system. The 1999 report directed that, at the end of the two-year pilot project, a decision would be made for the project to be cancelled, rendered permanent or extended by up to two years
The City took delivery of the trains in January 2001 and commenced use of the CPR lines in April 2001. The first six months of the operational phase involved the commissioning of the equipment and the training of operators of the service. After two years of planning, designing, retrofitting and training, the O-Train commenced operation on October 15, 2001.
Although the service has only been operational a little more than one year, the original agreements for the lease of the trains from Bombardier, and the rail line from CPR took effect on May 1, 2001 and will expire on April 30, 2003. Both agreements provide for an extension of up to two more years.
Given the timing of the expiry of the agreements, it is appropriate to assess the pilot project at this time.
In addition to the review undertaken by staff of the Transit Services Branch, the City Auditor’s Assurance Work Plan for 2002-2003, as approved by Council in June 2002, includes an audit of the O-Train pilot project, to be conducted in collaboration with the Department. The audit’s purpose was to support the Department in evaluating the pilot project and providing a fair, complete and objective assessment of the results of the pilot. Accordingly, all information relating to the project has been made available to the City Auditor and her comments are included in this report.
The evaluation of the pilot project is also timely as the City is currently updating its Official Plan and Transportation Master Plan. As a part of this process, a Rapid Transit Expansion Study (RTES) was approved by Council in November 2001. The objective of this study is to develop priorities for expansion of Ottawa’s rapid transit network for the next twenty years or more. Preliminary recommendations from this study will be presented at the Transportation and Transit Committee meeting of December 4, 2002, prior to their release for public consultation. A final report is expected in February 2003.
All information from the pilot project has been made available to the Rapid Transit Expansion Study team and the experience gained from the project will be used to build recommendations for the future rapid transit system.
This report outlines the original objectives approved by Regional Council, discusses the experience with the Light Rail Pilot Project over the project period, and evaluates the project against each of the those objectives.
DISCUSSION
The original objectives of the light rail pilot project as set out in 1999 were to:
1. Assess the technical feasibility of using an existing freight rail corridor for rapid transit.
2. Validate the projections for:
- Ridership;
- Cost; and
- Performance.
3. Allow proper analysis of larger scale implementation.
The objectives of the pilot project have been met through the planning, implementation and operation of the pilot project. With experience gained since the start of the implementation phase of the project in late 1999, staff has acquired significant knowledge, experience and data to provide Council with some preliminary information and analysis on each of the study components.
Summary
Evaluation
Overall, the Light Rail Pilot Project can be considered a success. The pilot project has demonstrated that a single-person operator passenger railway using diesel light rail vehicles can operate successfully on a lightly used freight line. All necessary approvals were gained from Transport Canada to allow the non-standard system to run. The pilot project has comfortably achieved the original ridership objectives of 5,100 to 6,400 total riders per weekday despite a reduced service frequency. In fact, when adjusted for 20-minute service, ridership has exceeded expectations by 33%. The objectives for new riders have also been met. The October 2002 average total weekday ridership was 6,350 and new riders are estimated to be 1,135.
The project has improved access to Carleton University, with 2,129 trips destined there on the O-Train each weekday in October 2002. The light rail service has also removed approximately 2,200 unnecessary trips from the central area per day.
The capital costs to implement the pilot project were greater than the $16 million objective by approximately $5 million due to a number of factors including: unanticipated costs arising because of requirements identified through the public consultation and the detailed implementation process; additional set-up contingencies; the construction of a noise barrier behind Traverse Drive; and the payment of PST and GST on the trains.
Annual operating costs are close to those originally budgeted at approximately $4.15 million per year, in comparison with a budget of $4 million.
The pilot project has a revenue/cost ratio of 24.5% compared with the transit system average of 55%. It operates on time 99% of the time, compared with 70% for the overall system and service is available 99.4% of the time, which is comparable with the overall transit system.
The following sections provide the details of the pilot and the assessment under the four major component headings: Technical Feasibility; Ridership; Costs and Performance. Each section outlines the original objectives, the experience during the pilot project, and provides some overall conclusions.
Technical Feasibility
Objectives
The objective of the LRPP was to demonstrate that a light rail rapid transit service could be successfully implemented on a lightly used freight line using diesel multiple units. More specifically, a two-way fifteen-minute service was to be operated on the CPR line between Bayview and Greenboro with five simple stations. The service was to be fully integrated with other OC Transpo services. The trains were to be operated by OC Transpo operators for whom a special training program was to be developed.
Experience
During Pilot Project
Regulatory
Issues
To operate a rail service on the railway network, it was necessary for the Region to become a railway. The light rail pilot project was incorporated as a Federal Railway with the trademark ‘Capital Railway’ in early 2000. A simpler application, to become a provincial short line, could have been made but the federal designation will permit the railway to cross the provincial boundary into Quebec in the future.
Transport Canada is the approval authority for Federal Railways and it was necessary to obtain approvals for a non-standard system. The LRPP was the first diesel light rail system in North America and also the first one-person operation passenger railway.
The Department has hired staff with experience in rail operations to implement and supervise the operations of the railway. In addition to this, it was necessary to retain the services of consultants to assist in the development of appropriate rules to govern the operation, the safety management system and the training program for operators.
Transport Canada staff were helpful throughout the process but it was necessary for the LRPP to satisfy all the requirements that would have applied to a much bigger railway. Although this involved a large amount of effort, it positions the City well to expand the system.
Service Level
The LRPP plan called for a fifteen-minute service to operate on the line, using two trains, which would pass at Carleton. From the planning study, the theoretical travel time from end-to-end of the line, including stops at the three intermediate stations, was 11 minutes, which would have allowed four minutes at each end for the operator to change ends.
The service has, in reality, operated at 20-minute intervals since it opened and staff has now determined that it will not be possible to improve this headway within the existing parameters of the system. As a result, instead of four trips an hour, there are three. Even with full speed operations across the diamond, the end-to-end running time on the line is 13 minutes and 25 seconds northbound and 13 minutes and 52 seconds southbound. These times are minimal running times, during normal operations. In reality, the southbound train has to wait at Carleton for the northbound train to arrive. It also normally takes the operator approximately 2 minutes 30 seconds to change ends at Bayview and Greenboro. With these additional times, the 15-minute headway is not feasible.
Offering a twenty-minute headway, rather than the planned fifteen-minute headway has implications for the capacity of the system, the possibilities for schedule integration with the bus system, and the level of service offered to passengers.
Three trips per hour means that in the peak hour, peak direction the maximum capacity is 861, rather than 1,148. There have been a few instances of passengers being left behind at Bayview Station but, in general, maximum loads of about 180-200 are experienced, which are well within the Talent trains capacity of 287 passengers.
The bus system is scheduled on a 15-minute base to facilitate transfers. This means that services of 15 and 30 minutes are operated and, where possible, timed to meet at transfer points. The trains operations at 20-minute intervals make it difficult to accommodate all transfers conveniently.
Service
Reliability
Since
November 2001, schedule adherence has been monitored using the onboard GPS
technology. Overall, it has been very
high with departures from Greenboro and Bayview being on-time over 99% of the
time. Delays at the two at-grade rail
crossings have been fewer than anticipated and, when delayed, the O-Train has
been able to get back on schedule quickly, usually within the next trip. The O-Train schedule adherence of 99%
on-time performance compares with 70% for the overall transit system.
Unlike
the bus system, when there is a mechanical failure or a problem in the
signalling system, service on the O-Train is halted. Since service commenced on October 15, 2001, there have been 212
cancelled trips, or 0.6% of all scheduled trips. Forty-two of these occurred on a single day this past June when a
train generator failed and the backup train was in for repairs. The O-Train service availability of 99.4% is
comparable with the overall transit system for which service availability is
99.3-99.7%.
Track
Condition
In the planning phases of the pilot project, conventional rail standards were used to make recommendations to the City regarding the condition of the track that was required. Conventional railway wisdom relies on track classification standards that have evolved over the years. These classifications for track are minimum maintenance standards to allow operating heavy trains (mostly freight) over a railway line. They specify the allowance in gauge (distance between the rails), number of good ties, types of rail and frequency of maintenance inspections of a variety of types. Given that the City intended to operate at a maximum speed less than 60 mph, the conventions only required Class 3 track.
When the Environmental Assessment of the O-Train line was carried out, it was not possible to determine whether or not any sound mitigation measures would be required. Preliminary calculations suggested that there would be no requirement for noise barriers, but this remained to be confirmed once the service was operating. There was a commitment to provide privacy fencing in the Traverse Drive area in the event that no noise barriers were required.
Until just prior to the O-Train launch, a speed restriction was in force on the line in the Traverse Drive area, prohibiting speeds above 30 kph. Noise measurements were taken in the fall, as soon as it was possible to operate full speed service on the line (64 kph). These measurements showed that noise barriers were required at Traverse Drive. Noise measurements were also taken north of Carling Avenue, but mitigation measures were not required.
Interim measures were put in place to reduce the noise of the trains for Traverse Drive residents while the fences were being designed and installed. The train speed behind the houses was reduced to 48 kph and, for trips late at night was reduced to 7 kph. After completion of the four-metre high sound barrier, the speeds were returned to normal. The City has received further complaints regarding noise and vibration from residents of the area although the noise levels are within the City By-Law standards and the vibrations are not sufficient to cause structural damage. The noise and vibration is not caused by the train used but by the interaction between the wheels and the joints in the rails. In order to mitigate the effects of the service on residents, the speed was reduced for the last trips (at night) and the speed of operations behind Traverse Drive was reduced to 48 kph in order to reduce the noise level after 23:00.
During the summer of 2002, the residents of a complex of row houses on Breezehill Avenue complained of excessive noise in the Bayview Station area. They expressed concerns that the ringing of the bell (as the train arrives and departs from the station) and squealing noise caused by the train negatively impacted their comfort. Noise measurements indicated that the sound caused by the train was low (an increase of 0.3 decibels over ambient). However, because the human ear can differentiate between sounds in a different manner than a machine can measure, it was acknowledged that the bell and squealing sounds could be easily perceived. Ringing of the bell is required by federal rules and is necessary to ensure safety for the commuters at stations. However, the distance in advance of the station the bell was rung was reduced. Efforts were also made to reduce the squealing noise. The squealing is caused by the flange of the wheels touching the inside of the rail as they begin negotiating a slight curve in the track leading to Bayview Station. A program consisting of greasing the inside part of the rails was put in place for the summer with positive results.
It has become clear, for the operation of the Talent DMUs as part of a rapid transit system, higher standards for the rail should have been adopted. Noise, vibration and ride quality have been adversely affected by the track conditions. Maintenance is undertaken nightly. However, since the beginning of operations, residents in a few areas have complained about noise and vibration. Tests demonstrated that the noise is not generated by the trains’ motors but by the wheels-rail interaction (over the joints or through curves).
The
Rail Crossings at Grade (Diamonds)
The Ellwood Junction and Walkley Diamonds are two railway crossings at grade. The Ellwood Junction Diamond is the crossing with the CN line that carries the VIA Rail Toronto service. The Walkley Diamond is the crossing with the Ottawa Central Railway (OCR) freight line.
These two diamonds have caused difficulties for the project in two respects:
· the Rail Traffic Control (RTC) of the diamonds is complex and the responsibilities for this involve negotiations with CP Rail, CN, VIA and the OCR; and,
· the track conditions at the diamonds have caused concerns for the wheels of the trains.
The shared ownership of the two diamonds, between CN and CP, called for CN to hand over control of the two diamonds to CP by July 2000. The lease agreement between CPR and the City called for the CP to hand over control of the two diamonds in July 2001. Given these provisions, during the early phases of the project, it was decided that the most efficient method for the City to ensure consistent control over the two diamonds would be to render the signal system automatic. With an automatic signal control in place at the diamond shared between the O-Train and VIA trains, the first train to arrive would receive a permissive signal indication, effectively minimizing delays to trains of either railway. At the Walkley diamond, shared by the O-Train and freight trains from the Ottawa Central Railway (OCR), the signals would be automatic for the O-Train and controlled for the freight trains. This installation was more complicated given that the OCR yard abuts the Walkley diamond and it was not desirable to maintain the O-Train to priority over freight trains. Some of the field equipment necessary to render the control automatic was purchased and installed at the diamonds with the overall signalling system.
Although there are legal
provisions in the contract for the City to take over control of the two
diamonds, there would be significant costs to the City to put that arrangement
in place. As the City would be
effectively modifying the CN signalling system, it would have to cover the CN
expenses to design and perform all the necessary tests to ensure that its
system continued to function in a safe manner.
There would also be a need to make software modifications for the
control computer in the CN Montreal office for which the City would be
charged. The costs associated with these changes would
be significant (approximately $135,000) and there remains the need to complete
the negotiations to the satisfaction of all stakeholders, which are complex
because of the widely different interests of the stakeholders. Due to the complexity of the negotiations
and lead-time for implementation once a decision was reached, for the purposes
of the pilot CN is supplying RTC at the two diamonds.
The track conditions at the diamonds caused
problems for the wheels of the Talent trains.
The trains were manufactured in Europe, where at-grade rail crossings do
not exist. Early on in the operation,
impact marks were noticed on the wheels and speeds over the diamonds were
slowed down to ensure safe operations.
Staff has been working with engineers from the National Research Council, who have designed templates for the rail profiles at the diamonds that minimize the impact on the wheels. These templates have been used at the Walkley Diamond and the problems have disappeared. The Department is currently waiting for the final grinding of the rails to the shape of the template at the Ellwood Diamond to be completed by CN, and is optimistic that this too will be successful.
Vehicles
The decision to use diesel light rail vehicles was taken in 1998, since the costs to electrify the 8 km line would have been too high to make a $16 million pilot project possible. The Bombardier Talent trains were available in the timeframe required and, although a new model, were already in operation in Europe.
The trains are impressive vehicles. Passengers like them and find them comfortable. However, they were designed for commuter rail services, which typically have distances between stops far greater than is the case for the pilot project, and therefore make use of the vehicles’ maximum speed of 120 km/hr. In the case of the O-Train, the average distance between stations is 2.7 km and the maximum speed is 64 km/hr.
Maintenance experience and vehicle availability have been good.
Although an excellent choice for the pilot, particularly given the use of an existing rail corridor, the Talent trains, designed for inter city commuter use are not necessarily well suited for inner City rapid transit applications. The floor height of 59 cm would make it impossible to integrate the trains into the urban streetscape without significant effort. By contrast, modern electric LRT vehicles have a floor height of about 35 cm and can be boarded from a regular curb. Second, the weight of the vehicles, at 72 tons, is considerably greater than the weight of an electric LRT at 40-45 tons. The weight would cause significant concerns in a situation in which pedestrian activity was not strictly controlled as well as causing vibrations. The turning circle of the Talent vehicles, at a radius of 70 m, would constrain the geometry of extensions more than LRTs, with a turning radius of 17-25 m. In addition, the acceleration rate of the Talent trains is 0.9 m/s/s, which makes it less suitable for a service with frequent stops than an electric LRT, with an acceleration rate of 1.2 to 1.4 m/s/s. Finally, the cost of the Talent trains, at about $5.5 million, is significantly more than the $2 - $4 million price tag of the lighter vehicles.
Light
Rail Operators
At the outset of the pilot project, it was decided that bus operators would be trained and qualified to operate the trains. This was a large departure from any other system in North America as, falling under federal jurisdiction, the O-Train would have been expected to employ Locomotive Engineers (who already meet all necessary federal regulatory standards). The idea was to train more Light Rail Operators (LROs) than were strictly required so that holidays and sickness could be covered by trained LROs who generally work on the bus system.
This approach, which has been very successful, was adopted because it would cost less and ensure that there would always be a strong reserve pool of operators to provide backup. The arrangement also promoted strong cooperation from the labour union, which had previously considered the development of rail transit as a threat to their members’ livelihoods.
Extensive training was provided for the selected group of bus operators and the success rate surpassed all expectations (28 of 30 successfully completed the training). There were six weeks of in-class rules training as well as on-train training provided by CANAC, which is the CN consulting firm that deals with training. There was also a mentoring program put in place for the months following the beginning of operation in order to provide the LROs with a resource should they have any concerns/questions regarding operating the trains. All but one of the qualified LROs has continued in this role. In October 2002, a program of refresher training was delivered to the 27 remaining LROs.
The success rate for the rules training, the retention rate of LROs and the professionalism and interest demonstrated by them lead to the conclusion that training bus operators to drive trains has proven very successful.
Use of the Line by Freight
The lease contract between the City and CP Rail contains provisions for freight trains to use the tracks during the hours when the O-Train is not being operated (between 01:00 and 05:00). Since the beginning of operations, no freight trains have been operated toward the city of Gatineau. However, occasional freight movements have been made by the Ottawa Central Railway between the Walkley yard and the National Research Council property. These movements require lifting the platform extenders to allow the train to go by the Greenboro station.
Platform extenders were placed on all platforms except Bayview, where the O-Train operates on a spur line. Initially, there was concern about the space between the extenders as a possible safety issue. In fact, for a few months, an experiment was tried at Carling station in which chains were placed between the platform extenders. However, the platforms with the extenders function well without any other barrier. There have been no incidents of injury associated with the gap or the extenders. The platform extenders needed to be adjusted so that access for wheelchair users could be accommodated smoothly. Wheelchair users, cyclists and people with pushchairs and shopping buggies have enjoyed the easy access to the trains.
Conclusions
The LRPP has demonstrated that a single-person operator passenger railway can operate successfully on a lightly used freight line. All necessary approvals were gained from Transport Canada to allow the non-standard system to run.
The major technical problems experienced have been associated with achieving the planned headway, the choice of Class 3 track for the project, and the two diamonds.
The current 20-minute headway reduces the attractiveness of the service and frustrates attempts to coordinate the train schedules with the bus schedules, which operate on a 15-minute pulse. This situation cannot be improved without the addition of another train and one or more passing tracks.
Experience gained through the pilot project indicates that simply applying conventional railway wisdom to determine the minimum track condition required was not successful. Although Class 3 track would allow trains to operate above the current speed of 40 mph, the condition of the track is not conducive to a comfortable operation for the passengers and noise and vibrations would be increased. Installation of continuous welded rail (CWR), which consists of lengths of rails up to 2000 ft. long instead of the current 39 ft., would reduce noise and vibration and increase ride quality. A beneficial side effect would be a reduction in required track and equipment maintenance.
Problems have been caused by the two at-grade rail crossings for which short-term solutions have been found. The RTC being provided by CN is working reasonably well but could be improved for the next year or two through negotiations with the stakeholders. In the longer term, if service frequency on the O-Train were to be increased, the possibility of grade separations at these crossings should be investigated. The need for this will increase as VIA adds more trains to the Ottawa-Toronto line. The other problem at the diamonds, of impact marks on the train wheels, looks likely to be solved completely through the work done on the City’s behalf by the National Research Council.
The training of bus operators to drive the trains has been highly satisfactory. The 27 successful graduates who are still driving the train are enthusiastic and professional. Since the start of service there has never been a trip missed because of the lack of a driver. Although the training stretched over eight or ten weeks due to problems with the project schedule that prevented on-the-job training, it would be possible to train a new LRO in six weeks.
The potential for shared use of the line by freight trains has not caused any problems although, since very little freight is using the line, there has not been a good test of procedures for the platform extenders. It is possible that, in the future, an agreement could be reached with CPR to not use the line at all for freight, in which case the platforms could be adjusted on a permanent basis.
Ridership
Objectives
The approval of the LRT pilot project included daily ridership objectives for a fifteen-minute service after one year of service of between 5,100 and 6,400, of which 4,100 to 5,100 would be current bus users and 1,000 to 1,300 would be new users to public transportation.
As well as ridership targets, the
objectives of the project were to improve transit access to key markets, such
as Carleton University, and to divert transit trips from the Central Area.
Experience During Pilot
Project
Given, that the O-Train has had to operate on a twenty-minute service headway rather than a fifteen-minute headway as originally planned, the level of service is 25% less than was planned. This would be expected to have a significant impact on ridership. Using an elasticity of demand with respect to level of service of –0.7, which is typical in the transit industry, the expected adjusted ridership would be 4,200 to 5,300, rather than 5,100 to 6,400.
OC Transpo has an Automated Passenger Counting (APC) system on 10% of its bus fleet. This system uses technology that is capable of counting and recording in memory all passenger movements on and off the bus. As well, the system records the time at all stops. These data are invaluable in the planning process and measuring the performance of the service. This technology was applied to the O-Train and one train set was successfully equipped with APC equipment. With one of the three train sets equipped, it is possible to obtain weekly ridership counts on weekday service and monthly counts for Saturday and Sunday. The system also provides passenger activity by station and by time of day.
In addition, three customer surveys have been carried out since the
beginning of O-Train service to explore the impact of the O-Train on people’s
travel choices and to monitor customers’ opinions of the service. Surveys were done in December 2001, March
2002 and, most recently, in October 2002.
The results of the March and October surveys are more meaningful as they
were carried out after the end of the initial free fare period. The full results of the October 2002 survey
are provided in Appendix A and are used as a basis for this evaluation.
The Automated Passenger Counting system has provided a steady stream of ridership information. The average number of boarding passengers by day-type and by month is shown in Exhibit 2. With the initial free fare promotion from October 15 to December 31, 2001, ridership on weekdays, Saturdays and Sundays was very strong. On average, over 6,000 passenger trips were made on weekdays with over 5,000 and 4,000 trips on Saturdays and Sundays respectively. It was evident from observations that families were trying out the O-Train on Saturdays and Sundays while it was free. Once fares were introduced, there was a dramatic drop in weekend ridership. During the summer period, weekday ridership fell as it does with the regular transit system. The reduced summer program at Carleton further reduced ridership levels. Since September, weekday ridership has grown to surpass the levels achieved during the period of free fares prior to January 2002 while weekend ridership is the highest it has been, apart from the free fare period. In October 2002, average weekday ridership was 6,352, which is at the top end of the planning estimates, despite the adjusted service level.
New ridership was estimated through the customer survey. Six percent of O-Train passengers had not used the bus in the past six months and, by the measure generally used in OC Transpo’s Attitude Survey, can be considered to be new riders on public transit. When customers were asked whether they would have made the trip if the O-Train did not exist, just under 82% said they would have made the trip by bus, 10% would have made it by another mode and 3% would not have made the trip at all. This suggests that about 18% of all O-Train passenger trips are new public transit trips, which is close to the projection in the original light rail proposal. This is equivalent to 1,162 trips per day by new riders on weekdays in October, or 286,000 trips per year. From the survey it is evident that, in addition to these trips by new riders, the O-Train has generated new ridership across the entire transit system. Fifty-seven percent of O-Train users said they use transit more because of the O-Train.
The two other objectives outlined in the September 1999 report were to improve transit access to Carleton University and divert transit from the Central Area. The 2,158 daily boardings at Carleton University (Exhibit 4) show that the service has attracted a significant number of trips by students and staff. From the survey results, it is estimated that 2,200, or 35%, of weekday O-Train trips have been diverted from the Central Area.
Other information from O-Train
passengers helps to fill out the picture of the impact of the O-Train service
on its users. Eighty-five
percent of respondents said they used the O-Train at least two or three times
per week. Sixty-three percent of
passengers take the O-Train to go to and from school, 24% use the train for
commuting to and from work, and 9% use it for shopping and recreational
purposes. Eighty-three percent of
passengers said the O-Train saves them time.
Fourteen percent of these said the train saves them more than 30 minutes
per trip. The average time saving was
24 minutes. Most O-Train riders, 74%,
said they either transferred to or from the bus system to complete their trip.
The latest passenger survey carried out in October 2002 indicates that 75% of O-Train passengers pay their fare with an OC Transpo pass, 14% use a bus transfer and only 10% use an O-Train ticket purchased from the vending machines, indicating that integration with the overall transit network is being achieved.
Over
90% of survey respondents agreed with statements that the O-Train should be expanded
to new areas, is a good investment for the City and that the O-Train is on
schedule. Over eighty-five percent of
passengers felt safe on the station platforms and agreed that the service was
reliable. Seventy-eight percent of
those surveyed agreed that the hours of operation suit their travelling
needs. Sixty-nine percent of passengers
felt the frequency of service was adequate while 20% said otherwise. The aspect of the service that showed the
least support was coordination of the O-Train and bus schedules. Fifty-seven percent agreed that they were
well coordinated, while 18% disagreed.
Respondents were invited to provide comments on any aspect of the service. The most popular comment, made by 249 respondents, was to expand the light rail system. This was followed by ‘increase the frequency’ mentioned 94 times, ‘likes the train’ mentioned 64 times and ‘bus and train schedules should be better integrated’ indicated by 56 passengers.
Another source of information that bears on the impact of the service on residents is the OC Transpo client service line. There were 147 customer contacts received up to October 2002 concerning the O-Train compared to 12,664 received about the regular transit system. Of the O-Train contacts, 43% were complaint related. This compares to over 75% for the regular transit system. The remaining 57% of O-Train contacts were to comment in general about the service, express a compliment, request information or make a suggestion about the O-Train. This compares with a ratio of 80% to 20% for complaints to compliments for the overall system.
Conclusions
The pilot project has comfortably achieved the ridership objectives of 5,100 to 6,400 total riders per weekday and 1,000 to 1,300 new riders in spite of the 20-minute headway. In fact, when adjusted for 20-minute service ridership has exceeded expectations by 33%. The October 2002 average total weekday ridership was 6,350 and new riders are estimated to be 1,135. While only 27% of these new riders claimed that they would otherwise have used cars, the pilot project generated new ridership that was not anticipated in the planning estimates by the 57% of O-Train riders who responded in the survey that they use transit more because of the train.
The project has improved access to Carleton University, with 2,129 trips destined there on the O-Train each weekday in October 2002. The light rail service has also removed approximately 2,200 unnecessary trips from the central area per day.
The O-Train has saved users large amounts of time, on average 24 minutes and, from the results of the October 2002 survey, is clearly valued by its customers.
Costs
Objectives
The LRPP was to be implemented at a capital cost of $16,000,000 and $3,940,000 in operating costs in each of the two years.
Experience
During Pilot Project
With the operation now into its second year, it has been
possible to make a full analysis of expenditures, both capital and
operations. The approach that has been
taken is to divide the costs into three categories:
·
Capital;
·
Operations from May 1, 2001
to April 30, 2002; and,
·
Operations from May 1, 2002
to April 30, 2003.
The
reason for the division in operating costs is that, while service to the public
did not start until October 15, 2001, on May 1, 2001 the City took over
operational responsibility for the line.
At that time a full maintenance team was in place at Walkley Yard, test
operations and training started on the tracks, and maintenance of way and signalling
for the Ellwood subdivision became a City responsibility. The year of normal operations from May 1,
2002 to April 30, 2003 gives a realistic picture of ongoing costs and is used
as a basis for the calculation of performance indicators and for projecting
future costs.
The
capital costs are summarized in Exhibit 5; the operating costs for start-up to
April 2002 are shown in Exhibit 6; and, the operating costs for May 2002 to
April 2003 are shown in Exhibit 7.
Capital Costs
The total capital costs for the pilot project will amount to $20,740,100. The actual costs are compared with the budget from the September 1999 report in Exhibit 5. A brief explanation for the variances is provided for each line item.
The over expenditures were discussed in detail in both the July 4, 2001 progress report to Transportation and Transit Committee and the February 19, 2002 financial report presented to the Transportation and Transit and Economic Development and Corporate Services Committees. Council approved an additional $4,950,000 in capital spending authority for the project in February 2002 to cover: unanticipated costs arising because of requirements identified through the public consultation and the detailed implementation process; additional set-up contingencies; the construction of a noise barrier behind Traverse Drive; and, if necessary, the payment of PST and GST on the trains.
The City’s applications for exemption from the PST or GST on the trains, which in total are $1.873 million, have not been approved by the provincial or federal governments. The total capital costs of the project will, therefore, be very close to the total authority of $20,945,000.
Operating Costs
The operating costs for the period until the end of the currently approved project in May 1, 2001 to April 30, 2003 are expected to be close to the budget estimate and are projected to be $8,037,500. The operating costs for the first year of operation, from May 1, 2001 when the City took responsibility for the line, which amount to $3,889,600, are summarized in Exhibit 6. However, the ongoing operating costs are more realistically represented by the annual cost estimate from May 1, 2002 to April 30, 2003. These costs are compared with the original budget in Exhibit 7. This shows the cost of a year’s operation to be $4,147,900, which is $207,900 more than the annual budget of $3,940,000. From Exhibit 7 it can be seen that, while train maintenance costs are $497,100 less than the budget of $1,305,000, other costs are higher. The three most significant extra costs are for insurance, operator wages and rail traffic control.
The City of Ottawa insurer has provided coverage for
the railway since its inception. The
“untested” nature of the single operator passenger service and the unfortunate
events of September 11, 2001 have had a considerable impact on the cost of
insurance coverage. After much
negotiation, the yearly premium jumped to $604,000 in 2002 from $480,000 in
2001. Original budget estimates of
insurance costs were in the $330,000/year range.
The annual operations cost of the trains is $175,000
more than expected. This reflects the
additional hours of service in the schedule compared with the anticipated
service. For example, service on Saturdays
was planned to fall back to 30 minutes, with one train, after 6:00 p.m. but,
after consultation with the Sounding Board, full service is maintained all
evening. The costs also reflect weekend
overtime, transportation costs and vacation time.
The Rail Traffic Control (RTC) function of the
Ellwood Subdivision was contracted to Centre Rail Control Inc. RTC monitor and provide clearances for the
railway, and ensure all abide by safe operating practices. However, as the Ellwood Subdivision passes through
two at-grade rail crossings, or diamonds, it was also necessary to ensure
appropriate RTC functions at these diamonds.
It had originally been planned to have the diamonds controlled
automatically, and much of the equipment needed for this function has been put
in place. However, it became evident as
negotiations with Canadian National Railway (the owners of the diamonds)
proceeded that this would require significant changes to CN’s control software
as well as some additional signalization changes in the field that had not been
planned. As a short-term measure, it
was necessary to contract with CN to provide RTC services as well as signal and
track maintenance. This cost amounts to
$145,000.
Incentive Payments to CPR
When the agreement with CPR was negotiated in 1999,
it included a provision for an ‘incentive payment’ of $0.70 per passenger, to
be made to CPR for weekday ridership above 5,100. The idea of the incentive payment originated in discussions with
CPR when it was thought that they would provide a turnkey, design-build-operate
service. The incentive payments were retained
as a part of the final agreement with CPR to compensate CPR for what they
considered to be too low a lease rate.
The 1999 report proposed that the incentive payments be made directly
from OC Transpo and funded by the extra revenue brought about by above-target
ridership levels.
Based on current ridership, this would have meant
payments to CPR of $120,000 by the end of the current pilot period and $130,000
for each year the pilot is extended, for a total of $380,000 by the end of
April 2005. This arrangement has been re-negotiated with CPR so that part of
the incentive payments are paid in fixed monthly instalments of $5,000,
starting in September 2002 when ridership first exceeded 5,100. These payments
amount to just above 40% of the total incentive payments due under the original
agreement. The balance of the payments, which is estimated to be $220,000 by
the end of April 2005, would be forgiven by CPR should the City exercise its
option to purchase the corridor. If the corridor is not purchased, the $220,000
would become payable to CPR.
This is an improvement for the City in the
conditions of the contract between the City and CPR and shows the willingness
of CPR to work with the City to make the O-Train project a success. The lease incentive payments, as specified
in the 1999 report, are funded from the overall transit revenues.
Conclusions
The capital costs to implement the pilot project were greater than the $16 million objective by approximately $5 million due to a number of factors including additional costs to gain regulatory approvals, improve passenger safety and accessibility, improve the track and rail traffic control system, mitigate noise, provide additional operator training and more work than expected to refurbish the maintenance facility at Walkley Yard.
The approach to vehicle acquisition was to buy the three trains for $17.1 million with a guaranteed buy-back of $13,537,500 after the two-year pilot phase for a net cost of $3.563 million. It was expected that PST of $1.368 million would be paid on the vehicles bringing the total to $4.931 million. It was argued that this approach was superior to the vehicle lease arrangement, which would have cost about $5.4 million. The cost-effectiveness of the chosen approach depended on the success of applications for temporary exemptions from import duty ($1.624 million) and GST ($0.505 million). The belief that these exemptions would be permitted was supported by expert advice from KPMG.
In fact, a 30-month deferral of the import duty was permitted but attempts to avoid paying the GST and PST have been unsuccessful. The import duty deferral lasts until June 30, 2003, but it is expected that this could be extended should the pilot project be prolonged. The total cost of vehicle acquisition was $5.369 million.
Overall, the costs of vehicle acquisition were close to what would have been expected in the case of a lease. However, the annual cost to extend the pilot project for up to two years, at $1,425,250 per year, is highly advantageous to the City.
The operating costs for the year of normal operation from May 2002 to April 2003 at $4,147,900 are very close to the original budget of $3,940,000. In fact, were annual inflation of 2.5% to be applied to the original budget for three years, it would become $4,240,000. The fact that the vehicle maintenance costs were significantly less than anticipated offset additional costs from insurance operations and rail traffic control.
Performance
Objectives
The cost per rider for the Light Rail Pilot Project in the 1999 report was expected to be between $2.50 and $3.02, based on the annual operating cost estimate of $3.94 million and daily ridership of 5,100 to 6,400. Based on the average transit system transfer rate, this would translate into a revenue/cost objective of 27% to 32%.
While no specific objectives were set for schedule adherence and service availability, the assumptions in the 1999 report were that these would be high, based on the reserved right-of-way and the availability of a back-up train.
In developing the proposed pilot project, the report recognized that it would be a modest project on a relatively short length of track and objectives for ridership and revenues were set in this context. However, for completeness, information on both the O-Train performance indicators and the overall transit system are included.
Experience
During Pilot Project
Annual ridership for the O-Train has been estimated from May 2002 to April 2003, based on ridership measured to the end of October and projected ridership for November 2002 to April 2003. The total ridership in this period is projected to be 1,565,500. Based on the annual operating cost of $4.1479 million, the cost per rider for the O-Train is $2.65. This compares to the objective of $2.50 to $3.02 for the O-Train and $1.48 on the total transit system.
In order to calculate the revenue generated by O-Train passengers, the OC Transpo average fare per boarding was adjusted to account for the O-Train transfer rate. The average fare per unlinked bus trip is $0.81 and is based on a transfer rate of 40%. The O-Train transfer rate is 74% and results in an average O-Train fare of $0.65 per unlinked trip. On this basis, the annual O-Train revenue is $1.017 million and the revenue/cost ratio will be 24.5%. This compares to the objective of 27% to 32% for the O-Train and 54.6% for the overall system.
The cost per new rider depends on how much it would have cost to supply bus service for those trips that have switched from bus to rail. From the October 2002 passenger survey, respondents indicated that 81.7% of their trips would have been made by bus if the O-Train did not exist. Therefore, the number of annual O-Train unlinked trips that would otherwise have been made by bus is 1.279 M (1.565 M x 0.817). The average transit system operating cost per unlinked trip is $1.48. Hence, the additional cost to provide transit service if there were no O-Train service would have been about $1.89 M per year. This means that the cost per new passenger trip is $9.55 if only the new O-Train trips are considered.
The O-Train has been operating at levels of schedule adherence and service availability of 99% and 99.4% respectively, in comparison with 70% and 99.5% for the overall transit system.
Conclusions
The performance of the pilot project has been fairly successful in comparison with the objectives implicit in the 1999 report.
The cost per passenger at $2.65 is within the expected range of $2.50 to $3.02. The revenue/cost at 24.5% is slightly lower than the 27% to 32% range planned. This is due to the high transfer rate of O-Train passengers relative to the overall transit system.
In interpreting the cost per new rider, at $9.55, it should be remembered that only the 18% of O-Train riders who said that they would not have made their trip by bus were included in the calculation. Fifty-seven percent of O-Train users who responded to the survey said that they use transit more because of the O-Train.
The on-time performance of the trains, at 99%, compared with 70% on the overall system, is exceptionally good and the availability rate at 99.4% is comparable to the overall system.
FUTURE
CONSIDERATIONS
There are currently sufficient funds in place to continue the O-Train operation for the initial pilot period, which ends on April 30, 2003. A decision is needed from Council to govern arrangements for at least the short-term future of the system. Possibilities range from closing down the system to making the system permanent.
At this time, the staff recommendation is to extend the pilot project for up to two years. This recommendation is made to keep all options open in the context of the success of the pilot project to date and the decisions that Council will be making in the early part of next year based on the results of the Rapid Transit Expansion Study.
In this section, the implications for extending the pilot project and closing it down are outlined.
Costs to Continue the
Pilot Project
Operating Costs
For the O-Train pilot project to be continued beyond April 30, 2003 would require extensions of the contracts with Bombardier and CPR and new contracts to be put in place for track maintenance, rail traffic control and signals maintenance. The contract extension for Bombardier would be subject to negotiation with the City and, although confirmation has yet to be received, is expected to be about 15% higher than it is currently. This is based on experience to date, as well as the effect of the end of the vehicle warranty period.
Tenders would be released for track maintenance and signal maintenance as soon as approval for the project to continue is received, and it is expected that the costs will remain the same next year as they are currently.
The rail traffic control arrangements need to be negotiated with CN, but for budgeting purposes it has been assumed that they can be held to the current levels.
The need for significant effort on the safety management system has been identified by Transport Canada. An increase of $54,000 in service supervision should provide for the needed assistance in this area.
An operations budget for May 2003 to April 2004 is shown in Exhibit 8. The budget is shown alongside the May 2002 to April 2003 operating budget and the differences are briefly described.
The total operating costs for May 2003 to April 2004 are projected to be $4,344,038 compared with $4,147,636 for the previous year. However, in view of the need to negotiate with Bombardier and put in place new contracts for other sub-contractors, it is proposed that a 5% contingency of $217,200 be added for a total of $4,561,238.
Capital
Costs
If the extension of the pilot project is approved, there will be capital costs associated with the lease of the line from CP Rail and the use of the vehicles. The contract with CP Rail allows an automatic extension after the first two years for up to another two years, with the lease price being increased at the level of CPI. This means that the lease price for the year from May 2003 to April 2004 would be about $275,000.
The trains were purchased from Bombardier with an agreed buy-back price after two years, which will occur on April 30, 2003. This buy-back price reduces at a rate of $118,750 monthly until April 30, 2005. Therefore, the annual cost of train ownership for the period from May 2003 to April 2005 is fixed at $1,425,000.
The customs duties on the trains were deferred for 30 months from January 2001, when the trains arrived in Canada. These taxes amount to $1.624 million and, although it is expected that they can be deferred for another 24 months, currently are payable in July 2003.
It is possible that some unforeseen track defects will be identified over the year or that the generator at Walkley Yard will fail. It is, therefore, prudent to include a contingency in the capital budget of $200,000.
In summary, the annual capital costs associated with the extension of the O-Train pilot project would be:
Corridor lease $275,000
Use of trains $1,425,000
Contingency $200,000
Total $1,900,000
There is also the unlikely possibility that the customs taxes of $1.624 million could become payable on the trains in July 2003.
Costs to Close Down the O-Train
As noted in the original 1999 report to Regional
Council, should the decision be taken to bring the pilot to an end, there would
be costs of close to $900,000 to decommission and ship back the trains. There would also be costs to decommission
the stations, although this is more difficult to estimate since it would depend
on whether Council chooses to have some elements in place for possible future
use. Some of these costs would be
offset by the post-pilot salvage value of the station equipment.
Were the project to be closed down and the Ellwood
Subdivision not purchased from CPR by the City, there would also be deferred
‘incentive payments’ to pay CPR. These
will amount to $80,000 by the end of the current pilot in April 2003. By April 2005, they would amount to $220,000
and would only be payable in the event that the City did not purchase the corridor.
It should also be noted that the O-Train has made it possible to serve Carleton University in spite of a 17% growth in student numbers over the last two years, without increasing the amount of bus service. In fact, a small decrease has been possible. If the O-Train were removed there would be a need for additional buses to accommodate the more than 6,000 passengers a day using the train. This would take up most of the resources for growth planned in the 2003 budget.
AUDITOR’S REPORT
Introduction, Objectives and Scope
The City Auditor’s Assurance Work Plan for 2002-2003, as approved by Council in June 2002, included an audit of the O-Train pilot project, to be conducted in collaboration with the Department. Given that the existing agreements between the City and Bombardier and the City and CPR are due to expire in April 2003, there is the need at this time to bring forward to Council an evaluation report of the Light Rail Pilot Project in order to determine if these agreements, and the LRPP, should be extended. As such, Audit & Consulting Services (ACS) has reviewed the preceding report in order to provide Council some assurances as to the completeness and objectivity of this evaluation.
The objective of ACS’ review was to ensure the accuracy and completeness of this evaluation report in order to facilitate Council’s deliberations on the future of the LRPP. ACS’ comments made herein have been based upon a review of a draft of the LRPP evaluation report as provided by Transportation, Utilities and Public Works on November 19, 2002.
Our review was conducted between November 1 and November 20, 2002. During this period, ACS met with a number of the Transportation, Utilities and Public Works and contract staff involved in the LRPP to gain a better understanding of the pilot objectives and how the pilot has proceeded. ACS reviewed existing supporting and operational documentation and the various Council reports relating to the establishment and management of the LRPP. Feedback was provided to the department on an ongoing basis throughout the period and was reflected in the revised report drafts.
Our review focussed on ensuring that the pilot to-date has been conducted in accordance with the directions of Council and that the department’s report provides an accurate and complete evaluation of the technical and operational issues that were to be assessed during the pilot. We did not assess the validity of the original decisions regarding the service to be used as a pilot, nor are we commenting on the appropriateness of the report recommendations.
Assessment and Specific Comments
In our view, the department’s report accurately reflects the overall objectives of the pilot as established by former Regional Council. At that time, a number of alternative routes and services were presented for the consideration of Council. The current service was selected as the most viable for the pilot. A number of technical issues required investigation and resolution during the initial phases of the pilot, which ultimately influenced the actual service start date.
The department’s report presents a full and fair discussion of the issues to be addressed during the pilot and accurately reflects the supporting documentation and analysis of results reviewed by ACS during the development of this report. We are not aware of any significant issues that have been omitted from the report.
A few significant issues discussed in the report are highlighted for the consideration of Committee and Council during its deliberations.
Technical Issues
The report discusses the technical issues and how they were addressed during the pilot. In several areas the report identifies the need for further improvements or possible enhancement to the operation. However, no specific action has been recommended at this time. The Department will address these issues at a later date, as in most cases they are dependent on the outcome of the Rapid Transit Expansion Study due in 2003.
Ridership
The analysis with regard to ridership numbers is reasonable, although restricted to the data available from various rider surveys conducted during the past six months. Should Council decide to extend the pilot, consideration should be given to expanding future surveys to capture feedback from the general population or non-users within areas directly serviced by the O-Train.
We have limited our review of the ridership data to ensuring the analysis correctly reflects the usage statistics compiled since passenger service began. It should be noted that the analysis presented in this report extrapolates from the data available as to new riders and service demands. This extrapolation is dependant upon the specific expertise of Transit staff, which ACS is not in a position to comment upon.
Cost Information
The cost data presented in the report for the first year of normal operations, while projected to the end of the year in April 2003, is based on a year of passenger service and is consistent with the analysis conducted by ACS.
As is indicated in the report, extending the pilot for two years has implications on the ‘buy-back’ provision of the Bombardier contact and would essentially increase the net capital costs of the vehicles by approximately $3 million (as compared to the buy-back conditions applicable at the conclusion of the current agreement).
Key to Council’s deliberations on the future of the LRPP is the analysis presented under Future Considerations in the preceding report. Based on ACS’ review, the analysis reflects the majority of significant considerations. The assumption that existing contractual agreements which will require re-tendering (e.g. track maintenance, signal maintenance and traffic control) can be extended at current costs presents a risk which should be monitored closely in the coming months. Similarly, the assumption that insurance costs will remain constant presents a risk if the pilot is extended. The inclusion of a 5% contingency is prudent however it may be insufficient should these assumptions not be realized.
The department’s report speaks to the deferral of $1.6 million in customs duties. Although these duties are currently payable in July of 2003, the department expects a further deferral to 2005 is likely. The continued deferral is based on approval by Canada Customs and Revenue Agency and relies on the continued acceptance that the trains meet the requirements for temporary importation. Ultimately, the City must cover these costs within the next three years unless the trains are exported.
The report indicates that the current agreement with CPR regarding additional rental fees or incentive payments is being re-negotiated. The current provisions call for the City to make payments to the CPR if/when the base ridership exceeds 5,100. Based on current ridership levels, the incentive payments to the end of the extended pilot are estimated to total $380,000. We understand that under the revised terms, a portion of the incentive payments will be deferred until the end of the lease and would be waived should the City purchase the line for $11,000,000 as set out in the original agreement. Should the City discontinue the O-Train operations the deferred amount would become payable. However, as the revised agreement has not been executed we have not been able to fully analyze the terms. The incentives are currently structured as a revenue sharing arrangement as described in the 1999 report. The continued appropriateness of this treatment should be reviewed once the revised agreement is executed.
The 2003 Draft Capital Budget of the City of Ottawa includes funding to allow the LRPP to be continued beyond 2003 as well as funding for improvements to the O-Train such as continuous welded rails. As indicated in the financial analysis, funding is necessary for the capital portion of the extension. Although not specifically identified as such, should Council not approve the continuation of the pilot, a portion of the capital funding proposed for the continuation and expansion could be used to shut down the O-Train. As is indicated in the Draft Budget, final commitment to these expenditures is contingent upon Council decisions regarding the extension of the LRPP and the Rapid Transit Expansion Study, expected in early 2003.
Finally, Council should note that the cost analysis presented in Exhibit 8 – Current vs. Future Costs in the report appears to reflect anticipated annual costs. The extension of the pilot would result in operating costs of $4.5 million in each of the two additional years.
Should Council decide that the current LRPP be extended, it is proposed that ACS include in its 2003-2004 work plan, a further audit of the extended pilot in greater detail to examine the results after two years of normal operations.
CONSULTATION
There has been no specific consultation on the recommendations of this report, although they have been discussed with the Rapid Transit Expansion Study Advisory Committee and distributed to all members of the Light Rail Pilot Project Sounding Board.
During the implementation phase, the public Sounding Board that was formed for the planning study was maintained. This included members of community associations in the vicinity of the track as well as special interest groups such as Transport 2000 and the former Regional Cycling and Transit Advisory Committees. Sounding Board input has been sought on key issues such as customer security and accessibility at Bayview Station, with results that enhanced the project.
We have consulted with various citizen groups with respect to noise complaints. A number of noise tests have been made to determine the level and cause of the excessive noise. In response to the elevated levels obtained during those tests, a noise barrier has been built along the track at Traverse Drive.
The disabled community was consulted about the arrangements at the stations as well as on board the trains. There have also been three surveys of O-Train users to evaluate their experience of and attitude towards the service. The results of the most recent survey are provided as Appendix A.
In addition, consultation with
Transport Canada, CP Rail, CN Rail, VIA Rail and Railway Association of Canada
has been ongoing in the development of the operating plan and in the resolution
of operational issues. We have also consulted
with Carleton University, Public Works Canada and the National Capital
Commission about station design and construction.
TRANSPORTATION
MASTER PLAN
The use of Light Rail Transit in Ottawa is supported in the Transportation Master Plan. The Plan calls for the implementation, in the short-term, of a pilot rail project to evaluate the potential for rail in the city. The project initiated in 1999 responds to this direction.
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
Current and anticipated future operating and capital costs of the pilot project are documented in the body of the report, and in Exhibits 5 through 8. The 2003-2007 Draft Budget submission comprehends the anticipated requirements arising from extension of the pilot program as follows:
Operating Costs
Pilot project operating costs are budgeted in
account 900473 LIGHT RAIL PILOT PROJECT.
The 2003 Draft Capital Budget anticipates approval of the extension of
the pilot project, and includes an additional request for $4.3 million in
2003. Exhibit 8 of the report lists the
operating requirement for the full year May 2003 to May 2004 as approximately
$4.5 million. The variance stems from
the part year effect of the 2003 budget submission. Increased contract costs anticipated in the pilot extension impact
only two thirds of 2003. As such,
approval of the existing Draft Capital Budget submission is considered
sufficient for the anticipated 2003 operating requirements.
Subject to renegotiation, lease incentive payments
to CPR resulting from above-target ridership levels will be paid from the
existing Transit Branch operating budget, as that is where the additional
ridership revenue is recorded.
Capital Costs
Original capital costs of the pilot project are also
budgeted in account 900473 LIGHT RAIL PILOT PROJECT. As per the detail provided in the report, two additional
unbudgeted amounts are required:
Extension of Corridor Lease $183,000 (Full Year $275,000)
Contingency for Track Repairs/Generator 200,000
Total $483,000
These additional amounts are not included in the
Draft Capital Budget submission.
Subject to City Council approval, the 2003 requirement will be
accommodated within the existing budget request, and 2004-2005 requirements
will be adjusted within the overall Transit capital program, creating no
additional draw on the Transit Services Reserve Fund.
Reduction in the O-Train buy back price as
negotiated with Bombardier, is included in the Draft Capital Budget submission,
account 901230 LIGHT RAIL CONTINUATION.
Cost of Discontinuing the Pilot Project
As indicated in the report detail, capital costs associated with the discontinuation of the project are difficult to quantify dependant on the future intent of City Council. The Draft Capital Budget submission includes no authority requests specifically for this purpose, although existing requests for pilot extension could be diverted.
ATTACHMENTS
Exhibit 1 - CPR Line between Greenboro and
Bayview
Exhibit 2 - Average Boarding Passengers By Day Type, By Month –
October 2001 to October 2002
Exhibit 3 - Weekday: Average Boarding
Passengers By Month, By Station – October 2001 to October 2002
Exhibit 4 - Average Weekday Boardings By
Station, By Time of Day – October 2002
Exhibit 5 - Summary of Capital
Costs
Exhibit 6 - Operating Costs – Start-up
to April 2002
Exhibit 7 - Operating Costs - May 2002 to April
2003
Exhibit 8 - Current
versus Future Operating Costs
Appendix A – O-Train User Survey - October 2002
DISPOSITION
Following approval of these recommendations, staff will conclude negotiations with the O-Train subcontractors to continue the pilot project for up to two years from May 1, 2003. The Department of Transportation, Utilities and Public Works will implement the Council direction on the recommendations. Should the extension of the pilot project be confirmed, staff will also develop a short-term improvement plan, consistent with the direction recommended by the Rapid Transit Expansion Project, for presentation to the Transportation and Transit Committee in March 2003.
EXHIBIT 1
CPR Line between Greenboro and Bayview
