June 17, 2009
Tamil
Demonstrations in Ottawa
Communications Review and
Recommendations
1.0 Purpose
Following
the 15-day protest by Tamil supporters in Ottawa (April 2009), the Chair of the
Police Services Board, Councillor Eli El-Chantiry, expressed concern about the
ways in which the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) communicated with the Board, City
Council, and the public.
Face Value Communications Inc. was mandated by the
OPS to conduct a top-line review of those communications practices and prepare
a report for the 22 June 2009 Police Services Board meeting.
The
following report is based on interviews with more than a dozen individuals,
including the Police Services Board Chair, the Chief of Police, and several
senior members and managers of OPS who played critical roles in this incident.
The report concludes with a list of 11 recommendations to enhance public
communication around major incidents in the future, with a focus on the unique
role of the police service in providing timely, accurate information to a range
of audiences. The Appendices include brief biographical information on the
report’s author and a list of interviewees.
2.0 Background / Context
Ottawa
is the site for hundreds of demonstrations and protests every year, the vast
majority of which are planned, predictable and peaceful. Typically, there are
only minimal disruptions to the public.
Such
was not the case on 7 April 2009. Around noon, a group of Tamil supporters
began demonstrating on Wellington Street in front of Parliament Hill. The
protest would last 15 days. At times, particularly over the first 48 hours, the
demonstration caused significant traffic disruptions and inconvenience for
commuters and nearby businesses.
Through
that initial period, some City Councillors and some members of the public
complained about road closures and traffic disruptions in the downtown core.
The rationale for the police approach to the demonstration was not well
understood.
3.0 Guiding Principles
In considering public communication during this
incident, it is important to bear in mind several guiding principles that are
key to any effective crisis communications strategy:
3.1 The timeliness and accuracy of
information are paramount, particularly during the first 24 hours. The Board Chair
raised the concern – which was acknowledged by Deputy Chief Gilles Larochelle,
who was the Acting Chief of Police at the time – that there was insufficient
information provided directly to the Board in the first 24-48 hours of the
demonstration.
3.2 The Police Board, City Council,
and local residents all have a legitimate need for accurate, timely, accessible
information about situations, such as large demonstrations, with a potential
impact on the public.
3.3 Wherever possible, it
is advantageous to provide the public with advance warning of possible
disruptions, detours or delays. It helps to manage expectations and provides
residents and business operators with the opportunity to make alternate
arrangements (as was the case with the major protest at the end of the
incident).
3.4 Members of the Police
Board cannot interfere – nor be seen to interfere – with operations of the
Police Service. Consequently, direct requests for information from front-line
operational personnel (e.g. incident commanders) are inappropriate.
4.0 Observations
Recommendations to improve coordinated OPS-City of
Ottawa communication during major incidents (see Section 5.0) are based largely
on the following observations:
4.1 It is often said that “hindsight
is 20/20.” This report, and the interviews it is built upon, all benefit from
that advantageous perspective. To be fair, no one could have predicted a
two-week protest involving thousands of demonstrators and costing nearly $1
million.
From a communications perspective, it is reasonable to
conclude that there were more things done right than done wrong over the course
of the 15-day demonstration.
4.2 The Ottawa Police Service and the
City’s Communications and Customer Service department should be commended for
the significant effort made to keep both external and internal audiences
informed. In many ways, OPS and the City’s communication efforts “went the
extra mile” by preparing numerous information updates, utilizing a variety of
communications channels including the media and the City’s 3-1-1 Contact
Centre, customizing responses to dozens of public complaints and compliments,
and providing regular updates through the course of the long Easter
weekend. After the first 48 hours, the
information flow became far smoother and remained so for the duration of the
demonstration.
4.3 It is, therefore, not the
intention of this report to second guess the actions or decisions of those who
guided the communications response to the Tamil protest. Rather, it is to identify
areas where improvements can be made that strengthen the role of communication
in supporting the operations of the Ottawa Police Service, as well as City
traffic management, public works and communications, and that help to ensure
public access to timely, accurate information about major incidents in the
city.
4.4 OPS acted quickly to issue its
first public advisory approximately 10 minutes after Wellington Street was
closed on Day 1 of the protest. Four additional updates were issued that day at
4:15 p.m., 6:15 p.m., 9:30 p.m., and 11:10 p.m.
This review of the Tamil protest did not include a
detailed analysis of the public complaints submitted to OPS or the City via
email or by telephone. In the case of public complaints to the police service,
it is evident that the majority centred on the police response to the
demonstration rather than confusion or misunderstanding about the closure of
Wellington Street and the subsequent traffic disruptions. Residents questioned
why police were not taking more decisive action to shut down what some
considered an illegal activity.
4.5 Day-to-day
interaction between OPS Corporate Communications and counterparts with the City
of Ottawa and OC Transpo is largely ad hoc. In a situation requiring a crisis
communications response, such as the Tamil demonstrations, participation in
Operation INTERSECT ensures a far more structured approach, with defined roles
and protocols. After being initiated on Day 2, Operation INTERSECT was highly
effective in ensuring consistent, coordinated communication amongst the various
partner agencies for the remainder of the protest.
4.6 Police personnel were the most
prominent spokespeople throughout the incident; however, it wasn’t until Day 3
that OPS provided a senior officer to speak to local media en masse to explain
in greater detail the rationale for the operational approach. Chief White was
quoted in the Ottawa Sun on May 14th
saying, “I probably would have five hours into this been in front of the press
...”
4.7 Several OPS interviewees noted
that the volume of email enquiries from the public added substantially to the
workload of staff who were already fully engaged.
5.0 Recommendations
5.1 OPS Corporate
Communications should meet with the Board’s Executive Director and senior counterparts in Public Affairs at the
City of Ottawa to formalize processes
and protocols governing both day-to-day operations and crisis situations.
The goals should be to regularize information exchange while leveraging and
integrating respective communications tools and activities to improve the
timeliness and accessibility of information for the public, employees, elected
officials, and partner agencies.
5.2 Communication between OPS and the
Police Services Board must also be formalized. There needs to be a consistent, sustainable, and
mutually-acceptable approach that will be effective in all major event
situations, whether the Chief is available or not. It is recommended that the
OPS Director, Community Development and Corporate Communications, meet with the
Board’s Executive Director to initiate those discussions and identify desired
outcomes.
5.3 Recognizing
the importance of providing the Board
Chair (or his designate) with timely police updates, it is recommended that
the Police Chief (or his designate) continue with the practice of providing
verbal updates (telephone or face-to-face) where developments could have a
public impact. The simplicity, directness and two-way nature of this approach
will ensure the information exchange is timely, appropriate and accurate.
For non-urgent matters, communication should be
governed by processes and protocols defined by the OPS Director, Community
Development and Corporate Communications, and the Board’s Executive Director
(see 5.2 above).
5.4 In a major incident, once the
Chair has been updated, the next priority should be to advise the remainder of the Police Services Board, the Mayor, and the
rest of City Council. They must be properly equipped to respond to
enquiries from their constituents and the media.
Given that the Police Service is accountable to the
Board, the most appropriate – and the most straightforward – communications
channel would be email from a member of Executive Command (or a designate such
as the Director, Community Development and Corporate Communications), to the
Police Board’s Executive Director.
In the case of a major incident, the message content
would originate from the Incident Commander and would be approved, as
necessary, through the chain of command.
OPS Corporate Communications would initiate contact
with their counterparts in the City’s Public Affairs Department and with other
partner agencies to ensure accuracy and consistency.
Once received by the Board’s Executive Director, the
email can then be forwarded firstly to members of the Board, followed by the
Mayor, the rest of City Council, and all of their respective staff.
In an ideal world, the Board would receive one
communication that includes updates from all the various players involved (e.g.
police, transit, bylaw, surface operations, etc.). However, the reality is that
it would be virtually impossible to craft, coordinate and approve such a
product quickly enough to ensure it’s timeliness and relevance.
These updates would also be posted prominently to the
OPS website, the City of Ottawa internet and intranet, and provided to the
City’s 3-1-1 Contact Centre. Updates from other participating agencies (e.g.
RCMP, OPP, STO) and City services (e.g. OC Transpo, traffic, bylaw, parking)
would also be posted or linked to www.ottawa.ca
to ensure consistent public access to the full range of relevant information.
Ultimately, residents should be able to visit the
Ottawa.ca website during a major incident to find the latest information on
police activities, road closures, detours, delays, parking restrictions, etc.
Once realized, all agencies involved in the incident would simply encourage the
public to visit the City’s website as the “one-stop shop” for all relevant information,
to subscribe to the City’s RSS feeds, and/or to call the 3-1-1 Contact Centre.
5.5 OPS should
distribute updates on police-related matters via email to local media as “Advisories.” Timely updates on other
components of the operation would be issued to media from the City’s Public
Affairs Department, OC Transpo, etc.
5.6 All public updates should be provided to the OPS Comms Centre and the 3-1-1 Contact Centre to assist operators in responding to public enquiries. (In the first few days of the Tamil protest, OPS alone received about 100 such calls).
5.7 In addition to posting
police-related advisories to the Media Centre on the OPS website, they should
also be posted to a prominent new
“Public Alerts” section on the OPS Home Page, with a link to the relevant
page on the Ottawa.ca website.
5.8 Communicating through mainstream
media (radio, television, newspapers) does not fully meet the public’s
increasing expectations for timely, accurate information, although the new
Information Radio stations (99.7 FM in English; 101.9 FM in French) may
eventually serve as a reliable source for real-time updates.
OPS and the City of Ottawa should explore the use of
popular social media, such as Twitter,
to distribute quick updates directly to the public. Ideally, Twitter
subscriptions should be customizable by Ward or neighbourhood to ensure that
subscribers receive only the most relevant information. Twitter feeds would
provide short, timely updates on traffic congestion, detours, major criminal
activity, etc. Ultimately, Twitter could be used by the full range of emergency
service agencies to advise of major fires, health alerts, flooding, power
outages, severe weather, etc.
5.9 OPS should develop protocol to guide decision-making
around the use of senior operational
officers as spokespeople during major events or incidents. Anecdotally, it
would appear that Insp. Bernard’s media availability at 4:00 p.m. on Day 3 was
effective in raising the profile of OPS messaging and demonstrating the
Service’s commitment to the safety and security of demonstrators and city
residents. Given that media enquiries more than doubled from Day 1 to Day 2
(from 15 to 32), there would have been merit in staging the media availability
on the second day, rather than the third.
Other players (e.g. City’s Public Works Department, OC
Transpo, Fire Department, etc.) should have their own spokespeople ready to
address questions and issues that are specific to their organizations, using
messages that are consistent with other participating agencies.
5.10 As noted in the OPS report
submitted on 19 May 2009 (RESPONSE TO OUTSTANDING INQUIRY #I-09-01: REVIEW OF
OPS COMMUNICATIONS PLAN), OPS must develop a standard approach to email enquiries from the public that are
related to a specific operation such as the Tamil demonstrations.
5.11 Finally, it is recommended that
the “Major Events Public Affairs Team,”
to be introduced to the Board in September, be given responsibility for the implementation of the recommendations in
this report. The Ottawa Police Service is strongly encouraged to engage
communications colleagues from the City of Ottawa in those discussions, along
with senior members of the local media corps who are likely to welcome the
opportunity to provide advice on the most effective ways to deliver reliable
information to the public.
Members of the Communications and Media Group of
Operation INTERSECT should also be given the opportunity to contribute to the
implementation phase.
6.0 Appendices
6.1 Biographical Notes
Derek
Johnston
President
Face
Value Communications Inc.
Derek Johnston has enjoyed an exciting array of
assignments and opportunities over 25 years in communications. A graduate of
Ryerson Polytechnical University (Bachelor of Applied Arts in Radio and
Television), he spent the first five years as a broadcast journalist, working
for a national radio network in Toronto and Ottawa.
In 1991, Derek made the move to government
communications as a national spokesperson on the new Goods and Services Tax,
eventually moving into a communications advisor role with Canada Customs,
offering strategic analysis and advice on a wide variety of program initiatives
and controversial issues.
Derek accepted a position with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 1994 as the
senior advisor to the Director of Public Affairs. Over the next five years, he
would assume roles of increasing responsibility, eventually becoming Manager of
the National Communications Services Branch at National Headquarters.
Since 1999, Derek has been working as a consultant,
specializing in strategic communications planning and advice, issues
management, crisis communication, facilitation, executive learning, and writing
services. Some of Face Value’s police
and security clients include:
Canadian Police College
Justice Institute of B.C.
Ottawa Police Service
Department of Public Safety
RCMP
National DNA Data Bank
Calgary Police Service
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA)
Canadian Police Sector Council
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
Military Police Complaints Commission
Derek is bilingual and lives in the Ottawa area with
his wife and three children.
6.2 Interviewees
The following individuals were interviewed for this
report.
Name |
Organization |
Title |
Eli El-Chantiry |
Ottawa Police Board |
Chair & City Councillor |
Lisa McGee |
Office of Councillor El-Chantiry |
Advisor |
Vern White |
OPS |
Chief |
Gilles Larochelle |
OPS |
Deputy Chief Patrol Operations |
Sue O’Sullivan |
OPS |
Deputy Chief Operations Support |
Charles Bordeleau |
OPS |
Superintendent Emergency Operations |
David Pepper |
OPS |
Director Community Development and Corporate Communications |
Mark Ford |
OPS |
Inspector, EOD Incident Commander |
John
Medeiros |
OPS |
Staff
Sergeant Community
Development |
Steve Bell |
OPS |
Sergeant Police Liaison Team |
Carole Lavigne |
OPS |
Manager Media Relations |
Margaret MacDonald |
OPS |
Manager Corporate Communications |
Anat Cohn |
OPS |
Communications Specialist Corporate Communications |
Denis Abbott |
City of Ottawa |
Director Communications and Customer Service |